Last of two parts
PART 1 | Alleged Chinese spy took 35 days to survey 120 critical spots in Luzon
The long, arduous, and sometimes downright dangerous mission to track Deng Yuanqing, Jojo Besa, and Jayson Amado Fernandez’s journey around Luzon island began with a tip.
It was the terms of the project that caused Filipino informants to approach Philippine authorities in the first place. Deng, said military intelligence sources and Besa himself, ordered the Filipino drivers to include military camps, as well as critical infrastructure in Luzon in their routes.
The drivers were also instructed to avoid government checkpoints, since the election period for the 2025 polls had already started on January 12. The start of the campaign period meant an uptick in police or even military checkpoints across the country. It also meant the need for increased caution.
For over 35 days, Besa and Fernandez, following Deng’s instructions — or with Deng in the vehicle himself — drove around the western and eastern coasts of Luzon to map out 120 critical sites to include military bases, energy and communications infrastructure, and sea and airports, among others.
Armed Forces of the Philippines chief General Romeo Brawner Jr. in a late January 2025 briefing with the media, said the information Deng and the two drivers gathered could be considered “military targeting” and would be “very dangerous once the data is used by another military.” Their equipment could capture details difficult to see from satellites or ground observation, Brawner added.
The project ended on January 17, 2025, when the three were arrested by Filipino authorities in Makati City during what would have been a routine pitstop to back up the data they had collected.
Besa, in a January 19 sworn statement issued before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), singled out a journey on January 4, a week before the election period began.
With Deng himself in the vehicle, Besa recalled lingering in the area around Gamu, Isabela near the 5th Infantry Division on January 4, 2025.
Besa remembered that part of the journey distinctly because while they were close to Camp Melchor dela Cruz, Besa said they had their gas tank filled “kahit medyo mataas pa ang karga ng sasakyan (even if the vehicle’s gas levels were still high).”
After a January 5 journey around the Mountain Province and the Banaue Rice Terraces, Deng and Besa then went to Santa Ana, Cagayan, where they drove around Camilo Osias Naval Base, a military base where American troops can preposition assets, according to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).
The military camp in Isabela and Santa Ana would be only two of several more they’d have to drive around.
No permits for equipment
Philippine authorities were also suspicious when they learned that the high-tech equipment — including the “military-grade” LIDAR, according to the NBI — had been shipped directly to Besa, and not to Deng.
Besa, in his affidavit, said he received “items” in his home on December 12 and was told to bring them to a serviced apartment building in Quezon City.
No permits for the importation of these equipment have been presented to authorities.
Two Chinese engineers, according to military intelligence, had flown into Manila from Australia on different dates in December 2024 to install the different equipment on the RAV4. It was Besa himself who picked up at least one of these engineers from the airport.
The same intelligence agents who backtracked the timeline of the Chinese operation identified the two only as Xia Wenhua and Yang.
“Doon, si-net up ’yung gamit sa sasakyan pagkatapos pinaikot ako dito sa Manila,” he said. (There, we set up the equipment on the car and I was told to drive around Manila.)
On the evening of December 12, they were given their route for December 13 — driving from a grocery store in Baler to a mall in Santiago City, Isabela, upon Deng’s instructions, said Besa. Deng also asked Besa and Fernandez to “take photos of bus stops and motor parking, as well as the end of the routes we were taking.”
It was a preview of what would turn into their work process with Deng.
Their Chinese boss would inform them of their intended route the night before, then they’d send him photos of landmarks that he had determined.
On December 14, it was the Port of Batangas, Maapon Bridge in Quezon province, and the Olongapo city hall. The routes were specific and systematic.
“Kapag bumibiyahe kami lagi pong magkaiba ang daan ng aming pagpunta at pag-uwi. Kapag dumaan kami ng expressway sa pagpunta, kami naman po ay nagbabayan-bayan sa pag-uwi,” recalled Besa.
(When we drove around, we would always take a different road going there and going back. If we passed through the expressway on the way to a location, we would then drive through the inner town roads on the way home.)
The vehicle, based on initial investigations, was not registered. Neither Deng nor his Filipino cohorts possessed a deed of sale.
According to sources, Deng and his team meant to simply dispose of the vehicle had they not been caught by the NBI.
Journey around Luzon
Deng himself was not physically present in the RAV4 for the entire surveying project. And there was no need for him to be present at all times, after all.
Besa, in his sworn statement, noted that they’d get calls immediately after they made stops to grab a bite to eat. He figured they were being monitored in real-time.
According to military intelligence sources, Deng was present when they drove through parts of Northern Luzon, including the port in Sta. Ana town, Cagayan, when Deng himself took cellphone videos.
The drive through Sta. Ana was one of the rare times they slowed down, according to the same sources — driving just 20 to 30 kilometers per hour in contrast to the 160 kilometer per hour they were accustomed to.
The Luzon project encountered hiccups, too.
On January 11, just after dropping Deng off in Makati, Besa discovered that Deng’s computer on board the vehicle wasn’t working.
“Mayroon pong pulang sulat sa display screen na portable PC sa loob ng sasakyan (There were red markings on the display screen of the portable personal computer inside the vehicle),” recalled Besa. Deng told them not to venture out too far.
In the following days, their movements were limited to short drives around Metro Manila. But on January 13, Besa picked up a “friend” of Deng’s from the airport. The friend had apparently flown in from China with parts to fix his computer screen.
By January 14, Deng’s friend, known only to Besa as “Andy,” already fixed the computer screen. After a day of driving around Metro Manila to test their equipment, Besa and Fernandez were told it was time to drive all the way to the Bicol region, southeast of Luzon.
Deng was supposed to join the drive but had fallen sick, military intelligence sources told Rappler.
Yet it was in the decidedly less precarious city of Makati where Deng and his team were caught. It was supposed to be just a quick stop for them, to back up the files they’d already transmitted in real-time.
During these Makati stops, recalled Besa, he’d see Deng pull out “what looked like a powerbank” from the computer. He’d then replace the “powerbank-like device” with another one. Deng, said sources, was caught holding a hard drive as he was trying to escape arrest.
Bigger espionage effort?
Less than a week after Deng’s arrest, the NBI announced to the public the arrest of five Chinese nationals suspected of spying on both the military and coast guard in Palawan, a province in Luzon where many missions to the West Philippine Sea are launched.
A month before Deng’s arrest, the military made public the discovery of at least five submersible drones in different coasts across Luzon.
The devices, said Navy spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Rear Admiral Roy Trinidad in a late January interview, had the ability to collect bathymetric data, including the depth of water, salinity, temperature, and sound signature — information that can be used for both commercial and military purposes.
Although the full forensic investigation of all five devices is still being completed as of publication, military officials have said that the drones have the capacity to relay information real-time.
Security and defense officials already see all this — the arrest of Deng, the arrest of the five alleged spies, and the retrieval of the drones — as part of a bigger effort to surveil the Philippines.
“There is a subtle effort to map out not only the maritime domain, even our human terrain, our political system, our political infrastructure. And if we start connecting the dots, it seems that this deliberate effort is being conducted by a foreign power,” said Trinidad in a January 28 press conference.
Trinidad declined to say which “foreign power” he was referring to, but it’s easy to read between the lines.
The Philippines’ relationship with superpower neighbor China, after all, remains tense in the West Philippine Sea — even as “effective diplomacy” led to a “provisional understanding” that has, so far, stopped dangerous and tense confrontations in Ayungin or Second Thomas Shoal.
Earlier, Rappler reported on the espionage and influence operations of a Ministry of State Security (MSS) agent who came to the Philippines under the guise of being a journalist for a Shanghai publication.
Intelligence sources said Steve Zhang’s activities in Manila and the 2025 arrest of the alleged Chinese spies are disconnected efforts. The six — Deng and the five arrested over alleged spying in Palawan — are unlikely to be agents of the MSS, according to informed sources.
Vigilance for Filipinos?
China, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassy in the Philippines, has criticized the Philippines over the arrest of Deng and has called on Manila to “stick to the fact, stop shadow-chasing, stop peddling the so-called ‘Chinese spy,’ and earnestly protect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese nationals in the Philippines.”
“The Chinese government, as always, asks Chinese nationals overseas to abide by local laws and regulations,” said China foreign affairs spokesperson Mao Ning in a January 22, 2025 press conference.
The Chinese embassy in Manila, in a separate January 25 statement, said the allegations against Deng were “baseless speculation and accusation.”
It also said: “The family of the Chinese citizen in custody approached the Embassy with concern about his safety and fair treatment and presented some facts different from the accusation by the Philippine authorities. We urge the Philippine side to base its judgment on facts, not to make presumption of guilt, stop airing groundless speculations about the so-called ‘Chinese spy case,’ handle relevant cases in accordance with the law, earnestly fulfill the obligations of the bilateral consular treaty and protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens in the Philippines.”
NBI chief Jaime Santiago has refuted alibis laid out for Deng by pointing our that he did not have the permits to conduct surveys, not were the equipment on the RAV4 merely commercial grade.
Both Beijing and the embassy in Manila have kept mum on the arrest of five more Chinese nationals over alleged Palawan espionage.
The five were prominent members of the Chinese diaspora in the Philippines, with Wang serving as head of several organizations, including the Qiaoxing Volunteer Group of the Philippines and the Philippine China Association of Promotion of Peace and Friendship, Inc.
Like Deng, Wang and his associates had mostly lived in the Philippines for several years before entering the radar of Philippine intelligence and law enforcement agents. A couple of them, like Deng, are married to Filipinas.
NBI Cybercrime Division chief Jeremy Lotoc admitted to reporters, although reluctantly, that the situation in the West Philippine Sea has made investigating these cases even more urgent. For law enforcers, it has meant jumping quickly into a case and determining, as best and efficiently as they can, if the espionage is by an organized crime group or is state-sponsored.
In the case of the Palawan group, the case was turned over to the NBI in November 2024 but was worked on for months by intelligence counterparts.
“Their work is 24/7, keeping watch over our country,” said Lotoc.
Lotoc and Rappler’s military intelligence sources hope that making public the cases of alleged Chinese espionage — that of Deng and the group in Palawan — will encourage Filipinos to report suspicious activities to authorities.
“Hindi ito kaya ng NBI at AFP lang. Kaya nananawagan kami sa bawat Pilipino na nagmamahal sa ating inang bayan…na maging mapagmasid tayo. ’Pag may nakita tayong hindi kanais-nais, isuplong agad sa kinauukulan,” said Lotoc. “Hindi kanais-nais,” or suspicious activity would refer to activities around critical infrastructure, and defense facilities, among others, Lotoc said in a late January 2025 interview with reporters
(The NBI and AFP cannot do this alone. So we call on each country-loving Filipino to be vigilant. If you see suspicious activity, inform authorities immediately.)
This is easier said than done. Deng, after all, had lived in the Philippines for years and was married to a Filipina for equally as long, when he was arrested for the alleged spying project.
Several of the five arrested over allegedly trying to spy on the Philippine Coast Guard and Philippine Navy in Palawan had permanent residence visas because they were married to Filipinas or had working visas from different employers, including now-banned Philippine offshore gaming operators.
In a late January 2025 press conference, Immigration Bureau spokesperson Dana Sandoval said the five had “embedded themselves” in Philippine society. Their entries to and exits from the Philippines also did not raise any red flags because they always had the proper paperwork and had “a perfect record.”
Law enforcement and Rappler sources said this is only the beginning of the country’s tougher efforts to crack down on alleged acts of espionage. – Rappler.com