By demonstrating contempt for NATO allies, demonizing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and supporting Russian pre-conditions for peace talks, the Trump II administration has moved toward breaking off America’s long security partnership with Western Europe and accommodating Russia.
This creates two dramatically different possibilities for US policy toward China, the direction of which is not yet clear. The Trump government may similarly acquiesce to Chinese domination of eastern Asia and the western Pacific region. Alternatively, the US strategy might be making peace with Russia to focus on countering China. Far from unified in its thinking about China, the Trump administration contains support for both of these nearly opposite approaches.
For US friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific, this is close to an existential issue. Absent US backing, the Asia-Pacific countries would be very hard pressed to prevent a Chinese hegemony that would compromise at least some of their autonomy.
Many commentators have concluded Trump is attempting a “reverse Nixon,” befriending Russia to isolate China, even though there are serious doubts about whether this could work. US President Richard Nixon engineered a rapprochement with the PRC that included his visit to China in 1972 and a normalization of bilateral relations in 1979. This move exploited the fissure that had developed between communist giants China and the Soviet Union during the 1960s. During a 2024 interview, Trump said: “You never want Russia and China uniting…. I’m going to have to un-unite them, and I think I can do that.”
Clearing the decks to focus on the China threat would suit several key members of Trump’s team — including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, and nominee for undersecretary of defense Elbridge Colby. The US no longer has sufficient quantities of military equipment nor the defense industrial capacity to support simultaneous wars on two fronts against major adversaries.
China, as well, is apparently worried about Trump trying a reverse Nixon. On February 24, Xi Jinping telephoned Putin to reiterate that China and Russia are “true friends” that “cannot be moved away from each other.”
It is still possible, however, that Trump will ultimately settle on a policy of accommodating Beijing.
Trump has revealed the main points of his grand strategy. He thinks that US allies are free riders and that the US gets cheated by supporting global institutions and multilateral trade agreements. He has particularly criticized Japan and South Korea, and he seems resentful toward Taiwan. He says little or nothing about the geostrategic importance of allies or about the rationale for America preventing China from gaining strategic pre-eminence in eastern Asia. His economic policy is centered on leveling the US trade deficit and incentivizing the reshoring of industry. Aside from assisting Israel, he wants to keep America out of distant wars. He seems comfortable with the idea of a world of empires, where the major powers annex their respective near abroads (Canada and Greenland for the US) and then respect each other’s turf.
It is plausible, therefore, that Trump’s policy toward China might play out as follows.
First, Trump continues to make supportive gestures toward Taiwan. The US Department of State recently changed some of the wording on its website about the US-Taiwan relationship. The website previously said “we do not support Taiwan independence,” but now that phrase is gone. In another place the website added that the US would endorse Taiwan’s membership in some international organizations. Both changes reinforce Beijing’s fear of creeping US encouragement of Taiwan independence. Pro-Taipei actions by Washington are consistent with a commitment to blocking PRC expansionism, but they could also be a means of increasing Trump’s bargaining power with Xi.
The next step would be clarifying: Trump proposes a bilateral economic deal with Xi along the lines of the much-hyped but failed “Phase One” agreement of 2020. As part of the deal, Trump acquiesces to Chinese leadership of the region. From Trump’s standpoint, this would solve three problems: China promises to buy much more US goods, shrinking the US trade deficit; America jettisons its free-riding Asian allies; and the US removes itself from possible military conflict with China and North Korea.
Recall that during his engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2018-2019, Trump was concerned about Kim’s long-range missiles, but not medium and short-range missiles — that is, Trump’s motivation was keeping America out of the line of fire, not ensuring the security of US allies South Korea and Japan. In the same vein, Trump has been non-committal about defending Taiwan compared with his predecessor Joe Biden.
America’s postwar foreign policy is premised on the notion that the cost of maintaining the “global cop” role is justified by the benefits of increased US security and prosperity. Trump may not believe that premise. Asia will be the next test case. – Rappler.com
Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu who specializes in Asia-Pacific international security issues. He is the author of four books, including Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security (Columbia University Press, 2013).